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CRIMINOLOGY
PAROLE BOARD DECISION MAKING:




Few aspects of criminal justice are currently
undergoing more critical appraisal than the incar-
ceration process.' Nearly every survey of the field
undertaken in the last five years recommends major
reform of current methods for determining which
convicted persons to imprison and what length of
confinement should be imposed. Most recommen-
dations for reform recognize the interdependence
of the parole and sentencing decisions. Conse-
quently, proposals for reform typically affect both
decisons. Nonetheless, much of the concern sur-
rounding the incarceration process centers on the
concept of parole and its contemporary correlate,
the indeterminate term. Although there is a grow-
ing consensus about the necessity of either abolition
or substantial modification of the parole function,
there is no consistency in the basis for believing
that such reform is required. In fact, proponents of
change cannot agree on even the most fundamental
effects of the parole process. We are told, for ex-
ample, that on the one hand, parole leads to de-
creases in terms of confinement 2 and, on the other,
to increases in time served.3 A lack of rigorous
research in the area encourages such antithetical
claims.
One issue that permeates the sentencing-parole
field is concern for disparity-dissimilar treatment
of equally situated offenders. Numerous reform
proposals concentrate on disparity, including sug-
gestions for sentencing councils and appellate re-
view of sentences as well as legislatively fixed man-
datory terms and the abolition of parole.' To many,
the indeterminate term itself accounts for the
'See D. FOGEL, "... WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF"
(1975); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974);
A. voN HIRSCH, DoING JUsTIcE (1976).
2 E. VAN DEN HAAO, PUNISHING CRIMINALS, 6 (1975).
3 Cohen, Abolish Parole: Why Not? 46 N.Y. ST. B. J., 51
(1974).
4 See also the proposal to reform the Federal sentencing
structure in S.1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
existence of great disparity in incarceration time?
The lack of adequate guidelines for the type of
information to be considered by the judge in mak-
ing a disposition, judicial variation in punishment
philosophies, and wide discretion in setting the
term of confinement are often seen as culminating
in gross sentencing disparities.
Under many sentencing structures once the de-
cision to incarcerate has been made the determi-
nation of length of confinement is shared between
the judiciary and the paroling authority.6 Within
such a structure, the sentencing judge sets the
outside boundaries of incarceration time, either by
specifying a maximum term, a minimum term or
both. Often, the parole board then determines,
within these confines, the actual time served in
prison. Thus, disparity in the time actually served in
prison, for those jurisdictions that employ such
sentencing-parole structures, is an issue that is rel-
evant to both decision points.
Although reduction of disparity is not one of the
stated goals of most parole systems7, it has been
argued by some that parole boards do serve to
reduce judicially created disparity through the ex-
ercise of their discretion in determining the length
of confinement. Recent efforts to change the sen-
5 Sentence disparity can, of course, take a variety of
forms, including decisions not to prosecute, the incarcer-
ation or probation decisi6n, and the decision as to length
of confinement. It is only the decision as to length of
incarceration that will be of concern here because parole
boards, generally, have only had direct influence over this
decision.
6 See V. O'LEARY & K. HANRAHAN, THE ORGANIZATION
OF PAROLE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1976),
for a comprehensive review of paroling policies and prac-
tices in the various American jurisdictions. The legisla-
ture also plays a significant role by virtue of statutory
restrictions.
7 On the contrary, recidivism, depreciating the seri-
ousness of the offense and rehabilitation, have been the
principal statutory concerns. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1003-3-5 (c) (1975).
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tencing-parole process grant increased importance
to ascertaining the validity of such claims about
latent functions of the parole process. According to
the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals:
Though it is seldom stated openly, parole boards
often are concerned with supporting a system of
appropriate and equitable sanctions. This concern is
reflected in several ways, depending upon ajurisdic-
tion's sentencing system. One of the most common
is through decisions seeking to equalize penalties for
offenders who have similar backgrounds and have
committed the same offense but who have received
different sentences.8
Similarly, the United States Board of Parole re-
ports that "to a very real degree, the Board of
Parole tends, in practice, to equalize [sentencing]
disparity whenever it is not bound to the one-third
maximum time required in 'regular sentencing. '
But the claim that parole boards do serve a sen-
tence disparity-reduction function still is ques-
tioned. After studying parole practices in New York
State, one commission has concluded that there is
"no hard evidence" that the parole board "reduces
sentence disparities by paroling those whose of-
fenses are similar after they have served compa-
rable amounts of time."'1
Arguments that parole boards do in fact reduce
unwarranted variation in sentences are often based
on the notion that when one central body makes
decisions in every case, it tends naturally to make
more homogeneous decisions than would numerous
de-centralized decision-makers." Conversely, the
idea that parole boards reduce time-served dispar-
ity is often questioned. This is due to the lack of
reliable empirical evidence showing such a reduc-
'tion, and a belief that parole boards make time-
served decisions in an arbitrary fashion in an at-
tempt to achieve ends like rehabilitation that are
beyond current capabilities. There does exist some
empirical evidence suggesting that state parole
boards may modify disparities arising from plea
negotiations, 12 but the question of whether and to
8 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 394 (1973).
9 UNITED STATES BOARD OF PAROLE, ANNUAL REPORT
(1975).
I" Citizen's Inquiry on Parole and Criminal Justice
(1976). Report on New York Parole: A Summary, I l CRIM. L.
BOLL. at 297.
" Of course, not all paroling authorities are entirely
centralized. They do, however, consist of a small number
of decision makers (in comparison to judges).12 J. SHIN, ANALYSIS OF CHARGE REDUCTION AND Is
OUTCOMES, (1972).
what extent parole boards reduce judicial incarcer-
ation-time disparity is unknown.
A corollary issue with considerable significance
in light of contemporary sentencing-parole re-
form proposals is the extent to which post-sentenc-
ing factors influence time-served decisions by pa-
role boards. A major historical argument for the
large grant of discretion given paroling authorities
to determine the length of incarceration, was to
provide an opportunity to observe the inmate's
behavior while in prison. In theory, evidence of
prison adjustment, as indicated by compliance
with institutional regulations -and lack of discipli-
nary actions, and participation in appropriate
treatment programs, would permit the parole
board better to gauge the inmate's prognosis for
successful release from prison. The question of the
extent to which institutional behavior factors influ-
ence time-served decisions is of considerable im-
port. If factors unknown at the time of sentencing
are critical in determining actual time served for a
large proportion of inmates, it is obviously impor-
tant to determine the validity of these factors in
assessing post-release success. If post-sentencing fac-
tors are not important in time-served decisions,
then the practice of providing paroling authorities
such wide discretion in time-served decisions is
questionable.13 One purpose of this study, there-
fore, will be an assessment of the extent to which
selected post-sentencing factors are important in
determinations by parole boards of time actually
served in prison.
Problems in Dispariy Research
The empirical evidence concerning disparity-re-
duction on the part of parole boards is sparse and
the topic is fraught with difficult analytic and
measurement issues. Numerous theoretical and em-
pirical complications attend any disparity research,
perhaps partially accounting for the lack of evi-
dence on the effect on disparity of decisions made
"3 Keeping control withfn the institution is an addi-
tional rationale for sentencing-parole structures that per-
mit parole boards to consider institutional behavior in
time-served decisions (see, e.g., N. MORRIS, supra note 1).
Regardless of the rationale invoked for the use of insti-
tutional behavior factors in time-served decisions, one
important question-and the sole concern of the research
reported here-is the extent to which such factors ac-
tually influence time-served decisions. It should be
stressed that if it is found that such factors do, in fact,
exert a significant influence on time-served decisions, the
validity of their use, for either institutional control or for




at various points in the criminal justice system.
One of the principal impediments to research in
the area is the absence of an agreed upon definition
of disparity. For example, it might be argued that
disparity can only be measured against the specific
goals of the sentencing decision. Thus, the factors
that legitimately should be considered in arriving
at a disposition when general deterrence is con-
ceived of as the goal of the sentencing decision may
differ from the factors legitimately relevant if re-
tribution is the sole concern. To the extent that
different decision-makers employ different goals
upon which to base their judgments, it might be
argued that rather than reflecting disparity, differ-
ences in dispositions simply reflect differences in
the goals of persons making those decisions.
A second impediment to disparity research is the
difficulty inherent in operationalizing important
concepts. For instance, equity in sentencing might
require that offenders with similar offenses and
prior records be afforded similar treatment. The
measurement difficulty, of course, is how to oper-
ationalize these concepts. Categories of conviction
offense are most often extremely heterogeneous in
the offense behavior that they encompass. Thus,
when conviction offense is "held constant" in dis-
parity research, there may still be much uncon-
trolled variance within categories. Similar prob-
lems of scaling and measurement are associated
with prior record variables.
Additional complications arise when the aim is
to examine the influence of several decisions on
disparity. For example, design constraints impede
research in the area of disparity reduction by parole
boards. Optimally, what is required for an empir-
ical assessment of this problem is an experimental
design including random allocation to groups with
and without subsequent parole board review as to
length of incarceration.
Further complicating the problem for research-
ers is the lack of comparable data available to both
the sentencing judge and the paroling authorities
for the same offenders. Thus, a special data collec-
tion effort is required for a study of the problem.
Finally, major complications in the empirical study
of disparity reduction are introduced by the myriad
legal restrictions imposed on both the judiciary
and the paroling authorities that can make simple
comparisons extremely misleading.
The centrality of the disparity issue to the con-
temporary call for fundamental reform in the sen-
tencing-parole process lends increased importance
to attempts to resolve these impediments to empir-
ical study of claims about the latent functions of
parole. A more solid empirical basis for discussion
than that currently available is thus required. The
major purpose of this paper is to begin an explo-
ration of whether and to what extent one parole
board has reduced time-served disparity arising
from the dispositions from several courts. Unlike
much prior research on the topic of sentencing
disparity, emphasis will be placed on the interde-
pendence of the sentencing and parole decision-
makers and the effect that multiple decisions have
on incarceration disparity.
THE STUDY
The Sample and the Data
To explore the questions of whether and to what
extent parole boards reduce judicial disparity in
incarceration length and to consider the influence
of institutional behavior on time-served decisions,
a sample of adult parole cases was obtained from
the United States Board of Parole. This sample,
which was drawn in conjunction with a larger
study,,' 4 consists of random samples of releases by
the Board of Parole in 1970, 1971 and 1972. Be-
cause of substantial differences in statutory limi-
tations on maximum and minimum allowable sen-
tences between juvenile and adult cases, only adult
cases are studied here. Additionally, persons sen-
tenced under specialized statutes, such as the 1966
Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act'" were ex-
cluded from this sample.16 Finally, only new court
14 The data used in this study were collected as part of
a parole decision-making project directed by Don M.
Gottfredson and Leslie T. Wilkins in collaboration with
the United States Board of Parole. Their permission to
use the data is greatly appreciated. The coding proce-
dures and definitions of terms are reported in D. Gottfred-
son.& S. Singer, Parole Decision-Making Coding Manual,
Supplemental Report Two, (Research Center, National
Council on Crime and Delinquency, Davis, California,
1973). The proportion of cases drawn by year are as
follows: For 1970, 50 % of the cases between January and
June and 20 % of the cases between July and December
were randomly selected resulting in 2,497 cases; for 1971,
30 % of the cases between July and December were
randomly selected resulting in 1,138 cases; for 1972, 30
% of the cases between January and June were randomly
selected resulting in 1,011 cases. The sample was drawn
prior to the adoption by the Parole Board of the guideline
system (see Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler & Wilkins, Mak-
ing Paroling Policy Explicit, 21 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 34
(1975)), and, therefore, the results of this study may have
greater applicability to other jurisdictions that have not
established similar discretion structuring mechanisms.
is 18 U.S.C. § § 4251-54 (1976).
36 Persons receiving "regular adult" sentences under
18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1976) comprised 75 % of the sample.
Of those excluded, Youth Corrections Act cases com-
prised the vast majority (18 % of the total sample).
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commitments (i.e., not parole or probation viola-
tors) were included in the sample.
The federal sentencing structure allows thejudge
to select among several types of incarceration dis-
positions for adults.17 In this sample, the most
commonly used alternative (sixty-five percent of
the cases) is the "regular adult" sentence, in which
the inmate becomes eligible for parole after serving
one-third of the full sentence.' 8 The full sentence is
selected by the judge within statutory confines.
Alternatively, the judge may sentence under a
section that allows the judge to set the maximum
term within statutory confines and to set the date
of eligibility for parole at some time earlier than
one-third of the maximum. 19 This option accounts
for two percent of the cases in the sample. Addi-
tionally, an offender may be sentenced under a
section that permits the judge to set the maximum
term and the parole board to set the earliest parole
eligibility date.20 This option accounted for thirty-
two percent of the cases in the sample. Persons
sentenced under these options and who were either
paroled, mandatorily released or released by virtue
of the expiration of their sentence as of 1973, were
defined as the study group for the research. Thus,
not only is the judicially set sentence length known
for each inmate, but the actual time served as
determined by the parole board is known as well.
The final study sample consists of 2,833 persons.
For each person in the sample, a wide variety of
personal characteristics, prior record information,
current offense information, and prison experience
variables were collected. The reliability of the in-
dividual items in the data set was found to be
acceptably high with reliability coefficients for
most items well above 0.8.21
These data are suited for exploring the issue of
parole board disparity reduction for several rea-
sons. Both sentencing data from numerous Federal
Districts and decision-makers and time-served data
are known for each case. Thus, the two types of
decisions relevant to the question-judicial deter-
mination of sentence length and parole board de-
termination of time served-can be studied for
each person in the sample. Also, this data set
17 See Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sen-
tencing Process, 84 YALE L. J. 810 (1975), for a description
of Federal sentencing practices.
'8 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (a) (1976).
'9 Id. at § 4205 (b) (1) (1976).
20 Id. at § 4205 (b) (2) (1976).
21 See J. Beck, S. Singer, W. Brown, & G. Pasela, The
Reliability of Information in the Parole Decision-Making
Study (National Council on Crime and Delinquency
1973).
contains a wealth of factors that may influence
both judicial and parole decisions as to incarcera-
tion time-from several indicators of prior record
and offense type to prison behavior items22-an
essential requirement if adequate controls on fac-
tors influencing sentence are to be exercised in
defining disparity. Additionally, the sentencing-pa-
role structure in existence in the Federal system at
the time these data were collected is similar to that
found in many jurisdictions, although the types of
offense may be dissimilar. Finally, the number of
cases available is sufficiently large to permit mul-
tivariate analyses of the problem. The question of
the influence of institutional behavior factors on
time-served decisions is also capable of study, as an
effort was made to collect such items that are
presented to the parole board for their considera-
tion. Thus, both time-served and some indicants of
institutional behavior are known for each person
in the sample.
It should be stressed that the data studied here
were collected prior to the implementation by the
United States Parole Commission of new guide-
lines23 and that, therefore, these results should not
be viewed as reflective of the current practices of
that board. The current practices of the United
States Parole Commission depart significantly from
the practices during the period of time reflected in
these data in ways that could exert a considerable
influence on the disparity question. Although these
findings will not be indicative of disparity reduc-
tion in the current Federal System, the operation
of the Federal Parole Commission at the time these
22 The following is a list of offense and prior record
items used in the study. Precise definitions of terms and
coding instructions may be found in D. Gottfredson & S.
Singer, supra note 14.
1. Type of Sentence-simple, consecutive, concur-
rent
2. Conviction offense-26 categories
3. Weapon in offense (and type)
4. Weapon with injury
5. Any indication of assault (regardless of conviction
category)
6. Seriousness score (see Footnote 32)
7. Dollar value of loss
8. Type of crime on first arrest
9. Age at first arrest
10. Age at first conviction
11. Longest time free since first commitment
12. Longest time served on any commitment
13. Prior prison commitments
14. Other prior sentences
15. Prior probation sentences
16. Number of prior incarcerations (including jail)
17. Probation or parole revocations
18. Prior convictions (number and type)23See note 14, supra.
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data were collected was similar to the current
operation of most parole boards.
Method of Assessing the Dispari y Reduction Hypothesis
As usually understood, disparity means that
equally situated persons are treated differently at
some stage of the criminal justice process. At the
decision point of interest here, disparity means that
equally situated offenders are sentenced to different
lengths of incarceration. There are numerous po-
tential sources for such disparity. It may arise from
inconsistency due to individual judges over time,
from inconsistency among different judges within
a district, from inconsistency among judges in dif-
ferent districts, or from all three. There are two
components of the concept of disparity that require
operational definitions for the purpose of this
study: One considers what is meant by inconsistent
or different treatment; and the other questions
what is meant by "equally situated offenders". The
first component will simply be indicated by varia-
tion in the maximum sentence length (for judicial
decisions) and in time actually served in prison
before first release (for parole board decisions).
When "equally situated offenders" receive equal
maximum sentence lengths in months, there is no
judicial disparity as measured hereU and when
"equally situated offenders" serve equal amounts
of time in prison there is no parole board disparity
as the term is used here.
The second component of disparity-what is
meant by "equally situated offenders"-is, as noted
above, much more difficult to operationalize in a
satisfactory fashion. There are obviously numerous
factors that may be considered by both judges and
parole board members in setting length of confine-
ment. Depending on the goal of incarceration that
is being pursued by the decision-maker (i.e., general
deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, or treat-
ment) the offender's prior record, the seriousness of
the conviction offense, the offender's family situa-
tion, and the prognosis for recidivism are but a few
of the factors that may influence the disposition
and, hence, be applicable in defining "equally
situated offenders." As noted above, the numerous
potential aims of incarceration, with their concom-
mitant differences in "legitimate" sentencing cri-
teria, have led some to argue that disparity cannot
be measured and, therefore, cannot be studied
empirically.
'The maximum sentence length was chosen as the
most appropriate indicant of judicial disposition since
under most sentencing alternatives it defines the range of
feasible incarceration time.
It is unsatisfactory to argue, however, that be-
cause two judges differ in the goals that they employ
in fixing sentence, disparity cannot be measured.
The point of reference for disparity should be the
dispositions given to two or more equally situated
offenders. If they receive different dispositions-
regardless of differences in purpose for these dispo-
sitions-they have been treated differently. If two
judges have identical cases and one, operating so
as to maximize deterrent goals, incarcerates for two
years and the other, operating so as to maximize
rehabilitative goals, incarcerates for five years, even
though these separate terms may be legitimately
related to the goal of the decision, a disparate
result, from the point of view of the offenders at
least, has been achieved.2s
Although there is considerable disagreement
over which factors should not be considered in
sentencing decisions, there is a good deal of consen-
sus that the characteristics of the offense and the
prior criminal record of the offender should be
influential.2s That is, although scholars differ some-
what in the extent to which other factors are seen
as permissible in setting punishment, there is a
growing body of sentencing literature that suggests
that the seriousness of what the offender has done
and the extent and nature of the offender's prior
criminal conduct should determine the sanction
received. There is considerable rationale, therefore,
for operationalizing the concept of "equally situ-
ated offenders" in terms of these factors. The con-
cept, "equally situated offenders" was thus opera-
tionally defined for the purpose of this study as
persons with similar current offense and prior rec-
ord statuses. The data used are relatively rich in
the amount of information concerning the prior
criminal history of the offender and the factors
making up the current offense.27
Two phases of the research were designed to
address the disparity reduction hypothesis. First,
multiple linear regression was used to assess the
25 Some scholars argue for the propriety of this form of
sentencing disparity (see, e.g., N. MORRIS, supra note 1.)
The purpose of this research is to attempt to determine
whether parole boards reduce judicial incarceration dis-
parity, regardless of the source (or propriety) of such dispar-
ity.i See e.g., note I supra.
27 See note 22 supra. One limitation of this method is
that it is certainly possible that there exist important
current offense or prior record dimensions that are not
reflected in the items available for study and which would
be useful in defining equally situated offenders. It is
argued, however, that the major factors thought to be
relevant in making such assessments are included.
1979]
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amount of variation explained by the same set of
offense and prior record variables for both the
sentence-length and time-served decisions. The rel-.
ative amount of unexplained variation serves as a
rough indicator of disparity after the offense and
prior record variables are taken into account.2
Thus, a reduction in unexplained variation would
be expected if the paroling authority was markedly
reducing disparity in respect to similar circum-
stances of offense and prior record. Second, because
the method of regression analysis used is limited in
the extent to which significant subgroup differences
that might exist are uncovered, a search for such
subgroups was undertaken by means of tabular
analysis, comparing disparity directly for specific
groups of offenders with similar offenses and prior
record.
Results
Table 1 summarizes the sentence length and
time-served data for the cases in the study. Whereas
the standard deviation for sentence length is over
twice as great as the standard deviation for time-
served, the coefficient of variation for time-served
is thirteen percent smaller than for sentence
length.2 The similarity between the two decisions
on this statistic indicates that the relative variabil-
ity of the two decisions is fairly similar; rather than
sharply reducing the variability in sentence
lengths, the time-served (i.e., parole board) decision
apparently moves the individual cases down the
scale of months served, thus affecting the variance
of the two samples, but much less substantially
affecting the relative variability about the mean.
These data indicate that, on the average, these
inmates served about fifty-two percent of their
maximum sentences. The bivariate correlation
coefficient between sentence length and time-
served is quite high (r = +.85).
The findings that there is no large difference in
the relative variability in time-served and sentence
length and that sentence length and time-served
are highly correlated casts some doubt on the
hypothesis that parole board decisions substan-
tially reduce sentence-length disparity. However, it
could still be possible that a greater proportion of
28See note 31 infra.
' The coefficient of variation standardizes the sample
standard deviation to the sample mean. It is, therefore,
useful in comparisons of relative homogeneity when
groups have very different means.
Variances computed on logarithmic transformations
of sentence-length and time-served yielded comparable
results: time-served = .46; sentence-length = .51.
the variation in time-served decisions is accounted
for by offense and prior record items than is the
variation in sentence length. Under the operational
definitions set forth for this study, if this were the
case, then regardless of the relative variability be-
tween the two decision points, time-served decisions
would be less disparate. In order to address this
question, both time-served in prison and sentence-
length were regressed on the same set of offense
and prior record variables. The large number of
offense and prior record items available for analysis
required that as a first step the number of inde-
pendent variables be reduced. Thus, items with a
significant bivariate association with either sen-
tence-length or time-served were allowed to remain
in the analysis. Under the operational definitions
set forth here, if the parole board did reduce judi-
cial disparity, then a greater proportion of the
variance in time-served than in sentence length
will be explained by these offense and prior record
variables. If similar proportions of explained vari-
ance between the two decisions is found, or if less
of the variance in time-served is accounted for
relative to sentence-length, then this will be con-
strued as evidence against the disparity reduction
hypothesis.
3 1
The step-wise regression results for both sen-
tence-length and time-served are presented in
Table 2. For sentence-length, a total of six variables
entered the equation in the step-wise analysis be-
fore additional variables added less than one per-
cent to the explained variation (prior violent record
and current violent offense, current conviction on
assault, the seriousness of the charged offense, the
number of counts on the current commitment,
prior prison sentences, and the seriousness of the
conviction offense),3 These items accounted for
" It should be stressed that the present study is not
attempting to discover the specific factors most influential
in determining sentence-length and time-served. Rather
the criteria set for this analysis are the total amounts of
variation explained in these decision outcomes by offense
and prior record items. Obviously, some of these inde-
pendent variables are highly interrelated. In addition to
the items shown in note 22, supra, a limited search was
undertaken to discover joint effects that would add ad-
ditional explanatory power to the set of independent
variables. Variables consisting of various combinations of
present offense type and prior record experience, weapon
use and prior record experience, and so forth were also
constructed. These were added as additional variables.
Thus, for example, attributes were constructed that
placed persons with both a violent prior record and a
current violent offense in one category and all others in
another.
2 The seriousness score values were defined by an




DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON SENTENCE-LENGTH AND TIME-SERVED
Standard CoefficientNumber Mean Variance D of Variation
Maximum Sentence-length 2829 52.4 2373.6 44.7 .93
(in months)a
Time-served 2829 27.3 478.1 21.9 .80
(in months)
' Life sentences were coded as 540 months, because it was necessary to establish an interval scale classification.
Under Federal law the minimum parole eligibility for persons sentenced to life is 15 years and the typical minimum
parole eligibility for regular adult sentences is one-third of the maximum sentence. Thus, three times 15 years is 540
months.
approximately forty percent of the variation in
sentence-length:3 Thus, for this sample of cases
and using the offense and prior record variables
available for study, only a moderate amount of
variation in sentence-length is accounted for. There
is, therefore, under the criteria established for this
study, considerable room for disparity (the unex-
plained variance) to be reduced by the parole
board.
Also shown in Table 2 are the results of an
identical analysis using time-served as the depen-
dent variable. Seven variables, six of which were
identical to those entering the sentence-length so-
lution, entered before additional variables added
less than one percent to the explained variation. Of
interest is the fact that the two solutions accounted
for almost identical proportions of explained vari-
ation. In fact, slightly less of the variation in time-
served is accounted for by offense and prior record
variables. Thus, under the criteria established for this
havior categories developed by M. Warren and E. Rei-
mer for use in a "Parole Movement Scale" in the Re-
search Division of the California Department of Correc-
tions. The scale values are the median scores obtained for
each item in a decision game in which parole board
members and correctional administrators were asked to
indicate the probability of successful parole required for
parole release after serving the average (median) time for
the particular offense/behavior category. The score val-
ues range from 235 for bigamy to 887 for acts of delib-
erate, planned violence causing death of an adult. For
the exact scale values and the rules used for coding
offenses from case files, see D. Gottfredson & S. Singer,
supra note 14. Clearly, this scale is only a rough measure
of offense seriousness, defined by a restricted group of
persons. It does, however, serve to classify offenses in
terms of behavioral elements (e.g., value of loss, degree of
injury, extent of monetary loss, and presence of weapons)
and may therefore be preferable to a simple hierarchy
based on statutory classifications.
m A regression using the logarithm of sentence length
as the dependent variable produced virtually identical
results.
study, time-served decisions are no less disparate
than are sentence-length decisions in this sample.
The high correlation in this sample between
time-served and sentence-length, when compared
with the moderate associations between the offense
and prior record variables and time-served, indi-
cates that the best overall predictor of time-served
is judicial sentence length. To some extent such a
correlation is logically necessary; after all, the max-
imum and minimum amounts of time served in
prison are constrained by where on the scale of
punishment the judge sets the penalty. However,
the large proportion of variation unexplained by
offense and prior record found in this study for
sentence-length left considerable room for disparity
reduction, as defined here, on the part of the parole
board. These results indicate, however, that for this
sample the parole board decisions were highly
consistent with the sentencing decision. Of course,
it might be the case that other offense and prior
record factors or their combinations not included
in this data set could reduce the unexplained var-
iation in sentence-length and thus reduce the ap-
parent disparity found here. 3
' As noted in the introduction, it has been claimed
that the disparity reduction function of the Federal Pa-
role Board is most effective in those situations in which
the Board is not constrained by the mandatory one-third
minimum sentence of the "Regular Adult" sentence op-
tion. This possibility was examined here by employing
identical procedures reported above for the total sample,
but only within those cases sentenced under 18 U.S.C. §
4205 (b) (2)-cases for which the parole sets the minimum
parole eligibility date up to one-third of the maximum
(approximately one-third of the sample). For these cases
(N=746) time-served and sentence-length were less
strongly correlated than for the total sample (r - .68);
however, the results of the regression analysis were also
not supportive of the disparity reduction hypotheses.
Thus, 45 % of the variation in sentence-length was ex-
plained by three factors (current offense was robbery,
simple versus consecutive sentences, and seriousness of
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Although these results cast doubt on the hy-
potheses that time-served decisions serve a substan-
tial disparity reduction function, it is possible that
the type of analysis undertaken thus far masks
important subgroup differences in the extent to
which parole decisions reduce disparity in sentence-
length decisions. That is, there may be some specfic
types of offenses for which parole boards do reduce
the variation in sentence-length (and others for
which they increase it). If such subgroups do exist,
the method of analysis used so far would not so
demonstrate. Therefore, a study was made, within
the constraints posed by the size of the sample, to
ascertain whether the reduction hypotheses is sup-
portable when subcategories of equally situated
offenders are viewed separately.
All cases in the sample were classified according
to level of seriousness.s Categories with over 150
cases were selected for further study, resulting in
G" the definition of seven seriousness categories. Each
a category was then further subdivided on the basis
1n of type of sentence (simple versus concurrent and
consecutive) and prior convictions (none versus at
-; least one). Obviously, the number of cases available
- places limitations on the number of factors that
can be controlled in this type of analysis. CategoriesV that contained at least fifty cases after these con-
trols were applied were then analyzed for evidence
of disparity reduction. The resulting subgroups
(shown in Table 3) can be described as cases ho-
Q mogeneous with respect to offense, seriousness, sen-
a tence type, and prior record. Admittedly, these
.,a controls are somewhat crude; however, they do
C serve to classify the sample into fairly homogeneous
" groups on the basis of items relevant to the dispar-
ity issue. The classifications shown in Table 3
account for forty-two percent of the parent sample.
Table 3 shows that for each of the classifications
defined for analysis the mean sentence-length is
be considerably greater than the mean time-served.
As noted earlier, this simply reflects the fact that
E most persons do not serve the maximum sentence
~ given by the court and thus emphasizes the impor-
.- tance of studying issues like disparity across several
M
less than one percent of the variance. For time-served, 39
.2 % of the variation was explained by six factors (current
offense was a robbery, the longest time served on prior
- prison commitments, prior prison sentences, simple versus
. consecutive sentences, longest time free between prison
3 commitments, and the seriousness of the charged offense).
"2 35 See note 32 supra. The classifications of seriousness
S used are those reported in D. Gottfredson & S. Singer,
supra note 14.
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TABLE 3
SENTENCE LENGTH AND TIME SERVED FOR SELECTED CLASSIFICATIONS
Sentence-Length" (months) Time-Served (months)
Classification Standard Coefficient Mtnnda Coefficientof Men Stadard ofMen Deviation o Men Deviations o
Variation Variation
Forgery under $500, simple sentence, at 37.5 22.8 .61 20.6 10.8 .52
least one prior conviction (N = 167)
Car Theft (unplanned), simple sentence, 32.9 14.1 .43 21.2 9.9 .47
at least one prior conviction (N = 217)
Forgery over $500, simple sentence, at 50.5 26.4 .52 26.8 15.1 .56
least one prior conviction (N = 89)
Theft (planned), simple sentence, at least 33.8 20.5 .61 17.8 11.4 .64
one prior conviction (N = 291)
Car Theft (planned), simple sentence, at 35.5 15.4 .43 21.1 9.4 .44
least one prior conviction (N = 284)
Selling narcotic for profit, simple sen- 56.3 31.3 .56 31.5 18.8 .60
tence, at least one prior conviction (N
= 54)
Selective service violation, simple sen- 37.0 13.1 .35 16.8 3.6 21
tence, at least one prior conviction (N
= 136)
decision points. Of most relevance to the disparity-
reduction hypothesis are the columns labeled "coef-
ficient of variation". It can easily be seen that,
overall, the differences in the coefficients of varia-
tion between sentence-length and time-served are
not large; however, some subgroup differences do
exist. In five of the seven comparisons there is
virtually no difference in the two measures. In two
groups, there is some evidence in favor of the
reduction hypothesis. For cases involving forgery
under $500 with simple sentences and at least one
prior conviction, the standard deviation for sen-
tence length is sixty-one percent of the mean,
whereas for the identical cases the standard devia-
tion for time-served is fifty-two percent of the
mean, a reduction of fifteen percent. For cases
involving selective service violations with simple
sentences and at least one prior conviction, the
standard deviation for sentence length is thirty-five
percent of the mean whereas for time-served the
standard deviation is twenty-two percent of the
mean, a reduction of thirty-seven percent. 6 Of
interest is the finding that this latter classification,
36 The coefficient of variation is dependent on the
standard deviation which in turn may be highly influ-
enced by a few extreme scores. In order to ensure against
the possibility that a few extreme cases were responsible
for the apparent reduction in variability for the two
classes discussed above, an identical analysis was per-
formed using only cases falling between the 10th and
90th percentiles on the sentence-length distribution. The
results were similar to those reported in the text.
which demonstrates the greatest disparity reduc-
tion as defined here, was the group with the small-
est standard deviation on sentence length. These
data indicate, therefore, that some subgroup dif-
ferences in the extent to which parole boards affect
judicial disparity may exist, and that such reduc-
tions may vary in magnitude according to the
particular offense under consideration.3 These re-
sults also indicate that such reductions are not
consistent for all categories of offenses.
The Influence of Inslitutional Behavior on Time-Served
These data clearly suggest that the major indi-
cator of time-served in prison is judicial sentence
length. Although there is considerable evidence
that the parole board moves penalties down the
scale of severity, indications are that this is done
systematically with little reduction in variability
'7 The analyses reported in table 3 were repeated for
the subgroups shown regardless of type of sentence (i.e.,
cases were included whether the sentence was simple,
consecutive or concurrent). It might be thought that
disparity arising from sentence type (i.e., otherwise simi-
larly situated offenders given different types ofsentences)
is reduced by the parole board. Disparity of this type is,
of course, more difficult to operationalize. However, for
the subgroups shown in Table 3 the results, in terms of
differences between the coefficients of variation, are es-
sentially the same. One exception are cases of planned
theft with at least one prior conviction in which the
coefficient variation for time-served is 11 % less than for
sentence length.
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for similarly situated offenders. The question there-
fore arises whether factors uniquely known to the
parole board appreciably affect the parole board's
decision of time-served. As noted earlier, the ability
to witness institutional behavior prior to setting a
release date has served as a major justification for
such delayed penalty-setting sentencing structures.
Perhaps the institutional behavior of most con-
cern-both to post-release prognosis and to the
theory of parole release as a mechanism of institu-
tional control-is rule infraction. Consistent ina-
bility to comply with prison regulations can be
viewed as evidence of increased probability of fu-
ture law violation, and the threat of a longer prison
stay might be an effective deterrent to institutional
rule infraction. Several rule infraction items that
were available to the parole board for their deci-
sions were available for this part of the study. First,
the number of prison punishments on the current
stay was coded, defined as any action (other than
dismissal) on charges of violations of prison rules
resulting in withholding of privileges, segregation,
isolation, loss of good time, any suspended sen-
tencE, or other deprivation. Second, prison assaul-
tive infractions were coded, defined as any assault
or threat to assault, resulting in a disciplinary
infraction during the present confinement, unless
there was a finding of not guilty. Thus, while the
first item gives an indication of the frequency of
rule-breaking, the second item gives some indica-
tion of the seriousness of such infractions. Third,
whether or not the inmate had a record of escape
or attempted escape from prison during the present
confinement was coded. 38
Institutional behavior items other than those
relating to rule infractions, such as successful par-
ticipation in treatment programs, -are obviously of
additional theoretical interest in a study of time-
served decisions. Unfortunately, data relating to
treatment participation were only partially avail-
able for this study and therefore were not included
in the analysis. The emphasis on disciplinary issues,
however, most notably in contemporary reform
proposals,3 9 suggests that there is considerable
merit in ascertaining their influence in reality on
time-served decisions. The bivariate correlations
between the rule infraction items and time-served
-8 There are limitations involved in using these items
as indicators of prison rule infractions. Perhaps most
important is the insensitivity of these items to the seri-
ousness of the infractions, which is only partially over-
come by the assault item. For this reason, the results of
this phase of study should be viewed cautibusly.
9 See N. MORRIS, supra note 1.
in prison (n = 2506; each significant at the p. <
.05 level) were as follows: escape history, r = .10;
assaultive infractions, r = .14; and prison punish-
ment, r = .24.
The question posed for this portion of the study
was whether institutional behavior had a signifi-
cant impact on time-served for the persons in the
sample once the judicial decision as to sentence
length was taken into account. Essentially, the
purpose was to discover the extent to which the
parole board modified judicial decisions on the
basis of knowledge about institutional infractions.
To address this issue, predicted scores for time-
served were formed on the basis of the linear
regression equation obtained by regressing time-
served on sentence-length. From these predicted
score values, residual scores were derived for each
person in the sample. The total variation in these
residual scores (which was twenty-eight percent of
the total variation in time-served) was then treated
as the dependent variable for a multiple linear
regression that treated the institutional behavior
items as independent variables. A step-wise solu-
tion was used with only items adding at least one
percent of the variance in the residual scores per-
mitted to enter. It should be stressed that the
purpose of this analysis was not to determine which
items, among those available for study, were most
determinative of time-served. Rather, the purpose
was to determine the proportion of variability re-
maining in time-served once the judicial decision
as to sentence-length was taken into account that
could be accounted for by these institutional be-
havior items. The results are presented in Table 4.
The two institutional behavior items entering
the regression equation together account for less
than ten percent of the residual variation in time-
served. Thus, there is evidence that institutional
behavior of inmates may influence the time served
in prison, but that the influence is not large. It
TABLE 4
MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION OF RESIDUAL VARIATION
ON INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR ITEMS
Coefli-Multi- cient of Change in
Variable Coefficient ofpie R Determi- Determination
nation
Number of prison .26 .068 .068
punishments
Escape history .28 .080 .012




might be that part of the reason that these items
are not found to exert a greater influence on time-
served decisions is their relative rarity in the sam-
ple. Only seventeen percent of the sample had any
prison punishment, only three percent had assaul-
tive infractions, and only two percent had an es-
cape history during the current commitment. The
fact that this sample represents federal inmates
might limit the generalizability of these results to
state systems where institutional infractions might
be more frequent.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
These results suggest that for the sample studied,
the parole board substantially reduced the time
actually served in prison from the maximum judi-
cially set sentence length, but overall the relative
reduction in variability in sentences for similarly
situated offenders was not large. The extent of the
reduction in variability for similarly situated of-
fenders was found to vary somewhat according to
the specific category of offense and prior record
studied, suggesting that the disparity reduction
function of parole boards may have a differential
impact according to offense and offender charac-
teristics. Larger sample sizes than those available
here would be required for a more intensive study
of the differential disparity reduction hypothesis. If
differential effects were uncovered in future re-
search, the current findings would suggest that
they might vary in magnitude according to the
specific offense under consideration.
The results of this study also suggest that parole
boards do modify sentencing decisions on the basis
of institutional behavior, but that these modifica-
tions account for a relatively small proportion of
the sentence-modification variation. In jurisdic-
tions where institutional misconduct is more fre-
quent or, perhaps, more serious, time-served deci-
sions by parole boards may be more greatly influ-
enced by it. For this sample, however, instutional
behavior of the inmates did not appear to be a
substantial consideration in how long offenders
would spend in prison. Of course, the question of
the validity of using institutional behavior as a
factor in time-served decisions-either as predictive
of post-release success or as a deterrent to institu-
tional misconduct-is a separate empirical issue.
This study has several limitations that might
have affected the results. Most importantly the
operational definition of disparity is open to ques-
tion. This is always the case in research of this type
in the absence of an experimental design with a
random allocation component. The number of pos-
sible mitigating and aggravating circumstances are
large. The possibility exists that significant factors
not included in the data set, and important in
defining equally situated offenders, exist and that
these factors effect the variation in time-served
more than in sentence length, and that, therefore,
the disparity reduction hypothesis is more tenable
than these results suggest. It is argued, however,
that the major factors most often regarded as im-
portant in defining equally situated offenders were
available and that if a substantial and consistent
disparity reduction effect with respect to offense
and prior record were present, then this analysis
would have found more evidence of it.
This study, as well as prior research, has indi-
cated that a good deal of variation in sentences
exists that cannot be attributed to either variations
in offense or variations in prior record. The results
of this study can shed some light on the crucial
question facing many sentencing reform propos-
als-what are the prospects that these proposals
will substantially reduce this unwarranted varia-
tion in sentences? One implication of these results
is that it is probably incorrect to assume that a
systematic review of sentences, which includes sen-
tence equalization as only a latent purpose, is likely
to achieve substantial reductions in disparity.
Without an explicit charge to look for and to rectify
unwarranted variation-and, importantly, in the
absence of concrete guidelines defining the bound-
aries of "equally situated offenders" within which
to judge consistency and inconsistency-systematic
review may simply be a matter of penalty substi-
tution rather than a matter of meaningful disparity
reduction. These results suggest that simply the
fact that a smaller group of decision makers is
involved in reviewing sentences than is involved in
initially setting the penalty does not in and of itself
ensure more consistent sentences.
Several reform proposals retain broad judicial
discretion in setting terms of imprisonment and
place emphasis on some form of sentence review,
either by an administrative agency or by the judi-
ciary4 0 as a means to reduce unwarranted sentenc-
ing variation. These are not likely to succeed,
judging by these results, unless explicit guidelines
are formulated and mechanisms are instituted to
ensure that they play a significant role in the
review process.
One current reform strategy that places consid-
40 An example is a proposal that emphasizes appellate
review. See D.A. Thomas, Equity in Sentencing (Sixth
Annual Pinkerton Lecture, School of Criminal Justice,
State University of New York at Albany, April, 1977).
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erable emphasis on equalizing sentences is the
guideline approach adopted by the Federal Parole
Commission (as noted, subsequent to the period of
time studied here).4 Under this strategy, time-
served decisions are made within guidelines reflect-
ing parole prognosis and offense severity. This
approach serves to raise the historically latent func-
tion of disparity reduction by parole boards to a
central decision-making criterion. Whether this
purpose is well served by this approach is a matter
for empirical inquiry.
The critical issue facing disparity reduction pro-
posals is the ability to balance the interests of
equity against the interests of individualized jus-
tice. Proponents of contemporary proposals that
"' See Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler, & Wilkins, supra
note 14.
allow considerable discretion in setting sentences
by the judiciary to accommodate the vagaries of
individual cases argue that discretion in pursuit of
individualized justice is inevitable-if not provided
for at the sentencing stage of the criminal justice
process it will manifest itself at earlier stages (e.g.
in charging decisions by prosecutors). Rather than
eliminating disparity, it is argued that eliminating
judicial discretion (as, for example, by rigid pre-
sumptive sentencing) simply makes it less visible.4 2
To the extent that these arguments are valid, efforts
to curtail judicial disparity in sentence length could
be made more effective by emphasizing subsequent
review, but the results of this study indicate that
review not specifically aimed at disparity reduction
is probably inadequate.
42See Thomas, supra note 40.
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